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Abstract: The government took Apple to court to demand decryption of a terrorist cell phone. The  warrant issued 
rested on the assumption that law enforcement should be able to do its work through extension of “access” across 
the population of encrypted iphones. Each phone exists as a defeasible (Rescher 1977) site whose cooperation 
(access) is assumed to be opened by the the manufacturer if directed to do so by government, unless cause can be 
shown otherwise. Defeasible argument couples rhetorically with metonymic force as a powerful argument trajectory. 
The reversal of burden of proof, now placed on the company to defend its encryption, permits the government to 
extend the scope of its power by turning cell phone companies into its helpers. This is the manner in which a 
government would "commandeer innocent third parties into becoming its undercover agents, its spies, or its hackers" 
(Goldman & Segall 2016). The test case was crucial for Apple, but it was resolved by the discovery of a third-party 
who could gather the information without the manufacturers complicity. 
  
1. The dark problem  
 
The twenty-first century communications revolutions generates expanding experiments, 
particularly at the next where the law has to grow to catch up with social activities. The law is a 
conservative institution that lags behind yet remains vulnerable too changes in the public 
practices. Airlines, railroads, telegraph services coupled with mining, forestry, agriculture and 
fishing to produce modern prosperity. Modern revolution also generated new challenges to adapt 
international, national, and local legal institutions to the web of complications attended to legal 
intervention when things go criminally or contractually amiss. So, too, with the cybersphere 
expands challenge to the police powers of the state. 
 
            Unfortunately, those who commit crimes have not missed the information 
revolution. Criminals use mobile phones, laptop computers, and network servers 
in the course of committing their crimes. In some cases, computers provide the 
means of committing crime. For example, the Internet can be used to deliver a 
death threat via email; to launch hacker attacks against a vulnerable computer 
network, to disseminate computer viruses, or to transmit images of child 
pornography. In other cases, computers merely serve as convenient storage 
devices for evidence of crime. For example, a drug dealer might keep a list of 
who owes him money in a file stored in his desktop computer at home, or a 
money laundering operation might retain false financial records in a file on a 
network server. Indeed, virtually every class of crime can involve some form of 
digital evidence. (Hagan & Judish 1979)   
 
Communication networks organization argument activities that depend upon an ostensible open 
system of exchange but that is actually drawn around of a series of borders through which 
property becomes defined and useful security is achieved. The interests of the legal system is in 
the capacity of network logs, email, word processing files and image files to “provide the 
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government with important (sometimes essential) evidence in a criminal case” (Hagan & Judish 
1979). 
Shadow networks accompany all forms of human empire. Neo-liberal America is no 
exception. James Scott (1985, 1990) identifies “weapons of the weak” as a practice that depends 
upon challenging public transcripts with anonymous, ambiguous, seemingly passive but 
aggressive acts of disruption, vandalism and disturbance. The highway man was a romantic 
figure, escaping the constraints of industrialism and domestic life. So, too, the mysteries of 
criminal concealment and shadow populations renew themselves in an Internet world. The dark 
web is a term used to refer that are hidden deepen among web connections. These are constituted 
by friend-to-friend networks and popular services such as Freenet, I2P, and To (Dark 
Web…n.d.)  The Silk Road offered an infamous case where subterfuge was underway with 
illegal drug dispersal. In the police discipline, the Internet is imagined as a space to conspire, 
hide secrets, and assemble plots. Jamie Bar (2014) described the dark net as an undergrounded 
constituted by subcultures that included “social media racists, cam girls, self-harm communities, 
drug markets, cryptoanarchists and transhumanists.” 
 
2. Surveillance society 
 
Into the mix of suspicion about activities of criminals and hiddenness of evidence comes entered 
the institutional momentum of surveillance and communications control of the Patriot Act. The 
public was unaware of precisely how much Congress had capitulated to fears of terrorism. Media 
companies were reluctant to let their customers know about private media surveillance and data 
sales of behavior. The same media companies were even more reserved about giving up their 
complicity with government orders for data. James Clapper the head of the National Intelligence 
for the National Security Agency (NSA) that had just finished a massive phone sweep operation 
on U.S. Cellular and Verizon was asked by Sen. Ron Wyden directly at a March 12, 2013 
hearing:  “Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of 
Americans?”  Clapper’s answer: “No Sir.” (Kessler 2013). Of course, the Senate had been 
informed of data capture programs had been going on since 2007. The protections were 
rationalized by claims that courts are involved in special cases, even though FISA courts are 
secret and turned down not so much as a single request; further, the information is described as 
metadata which makes it sounds harmless in the particular case—which of course it may be, until 
back traced to the source from which it’s taken. Shortly to follow were the Snowdown leaks. It 
was revealed that the NSA was “harvesting millions of email and instant messaging contact lists, 
searching email content, tracking and mapping the location of cell phones. Snowden’s leaks were 
not the last (England 2014). Credit card hacking soon followed as popular sport. The Panama 
papers were thrilling enough for a hundred journalists to keep secret and the story ripen for a 
year. 
 
3. Fictions of presence & legitimation controversy  
 
The communications industry in the United States plays a tricky game.  
 
Ever since Edward Snowden released a mountain of information about the extent 
of U.S. government secret surveillance, the battle has been growing between tech 
companies and the government over access to data… Apple, Google, Microsoft 
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and others to lock down, or encrypt, data on smartphones and digital devices. 
(Woodruff 2015) 
 
Encryption protects clientele. Perception of security are core to maintain the legitimacy of digital 
activities. The whole simulated apparatus works to the extent that users make a defeasible 
judgment. The absence of social presence is discounted by the assumption that intrusions by 
surveillance apparatus of business, government and others doesn’t really make a difference. A 
more sophisticated judgment locates the lack of presence as possibly mattering, but its problems 
are subject to correction, once lack of actual presence of an other matters. In this context, efforts 
to guard privacy through encryption devices are key to maintaining the legitimacy of the whole 
normalized operation. Those comfortable with a digital augmentation of their lifeworld in the 
first place can remain comfortable, ever more dependent, upon the apparatus without worry—
because there is no technological means of intrusion. The technical assurance of privacy is key to 
the legitimacy of the communications industry. 
 The interests of the state and industry are stressed to the breaking point when it comes to 
cybersecurity. The efforts of the state to put on access and control devices goes as far back as 
Clipper Ship technologies. Even with repeated efforts to whip of fears of Chinese and Russian 
sponsored hack operations, business has been reluctant to subject its projects to machine control. 
The government is granted access to stored data in sets of not well-publicized rules. 
 
4. Defeasible phones & the politics of encryption  
 
Into the mix of appearance and illusion, things noticeable and not, plopped the cell phone of a 
San Bernardino terrorist. There are events that explode over the front page, bringing together a 
clash of people, agencies, and publics at a particular location. The volatility of the cases, 
themselves, render the discourse of interest to expert and lay publics alike. Network 
argumentation becomes exposed when a case erupts that forces to strive to capture and work 
toward personal, institutional, and public ends. The case concerned the partially destroyed 
iPhone used by Syed Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik who murdered 14 at a holiday 
luncheon. The government inserted then withdrew litigation against Apple. The arguments 
asserted the need to have the phone opened in order to achieve access to potential evidence. 
Apple had built the encryption coding device, so it was assumed that it could and should reverse 
engineer the code in order to get into the phone, without efforts that would destroy the 
information secured within. 
 Solving a “dark problem” was desirable for evidence-hungry investigators; however the 
politics of control are quite another for the public.  In a networked world, however, an individual 
phone traffics metonymically in the orbits personal and national security concerns. PBS 
discussed the politics of encryption. 
 
DAVID SANGER: And that’s why, to borrow your iPhone here, this is a 
national security problem in your pocket, and in everybody’s pocket. So, for 99.9 
percent of communications, the government wants you to encrypt more, because 
they don’t want criminals to be able to get into your bank account. Your whole 
life is on this phone, right? 
WILLIAM BRANGHAM: Right. 
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DAVID SANGER: Everything, medical data, financial data, conversations back 
and forth with family members. 
And they’re protected by that four-digit code you type in, which in turn creates a 
much longer encryption key. So, the question is, who gets to hold on to that key? 
And Apple said, we don’t want it. We want you to have your own key. Well, the 
problem… 
WILLIAM BRANGHAM: We being the individual user. 
DAVID SANGER: The individual. 
So, if the FBI wanted your data, or the NSA wanted to go in and get it because 
they thought you were communicating with a terrorist [the dark problem], what 
Apple is saying, don’t bring that warrant to us. Go give it to William, and have 
him give you the key. Well, of course, the FBI’s view is, drug dealers, terrorists, 
they’re not likely to turn over a key. (PBS 2015) 
  
The argument for government access turned on a technical rule, however, not public 
demand. The United States federal statute, The All Writs Act 28 U.S.C. ѯ 1651 furnished the 
basis of arguing that private actors should be compelled to serve investigative evidence of the 
state—even when no longer attached to a property. The original form of the law was the 
Judiciary Act of 1789. It was modernized in 1989. The Supreme Court authorized The All Writs 
Act 28 U.S.C. ѯ 1651 authorizes the United States federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or 
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of 
law.” The act in its original form was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The modern form of the 
act was first passed in 1911 “and the act has been amended several times since then, but it has 
not changed significantly in substance since 1789” (All Writs Act, n.d.). A writ was acceptable if 
it met 4 tests: there were no alternative remedies, that it was offered in an established 
jurisdiction, that it was necessary or fitting for the case at hand, and overall agreeable to the 
usages and principles of the law. In particular, “the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in United States v. 
New York Telephone Co. (1977) that the act provided authority for a U.S. District Court to order 
a telephone company to assist law enforcement officials in installing a device on a rotary phone 
in order to track the phone numbers dialed on that phone, which was reasonably believed to be 
used in furtherance of criminal activity” (All Writs Act, n.d.). 
 The logic of the federal case was hooked into defeasible reasoning; that is the 
company should provide access unless they can show cause as to why the apparatus does not 
meet the conditions of a legitimate writ. The position is something like a decree nisi, a 
condition set up for a ruling upon a condition that a rule applies unless a fact arises that 
would otherwise obstruct it. A rule nisi (unless) is a court order “that does not have any force 
unless a particular condition is met—“typically, the condition is that an adversely affected 
party fail to provide satisfactory evidence or argument that the decree should not take effect” 
(Decree nisi, n.d.). Apple did not concede the case because the concession would shift 
presumption and burden of proof to the manufacturers who were interested primarily in 
controlling their own access to their data. Cindy Cohn of the Electronic Frontier’s 
Foundation supported Apple by posing the paradox. “A proposal to protect our security by 
weakening our security is going in the wrong direction,” she claimed. “If the government 
were to suggest that no one put locks on their doors because if we were a terrorist it would be 
harder to get into our house, we would think that was a bad idea.”  “This is pretty much the 
digital equivalent of that,” she maintained (Mello 2015). 
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5. Conclusion: liberty & control   
 
Apple put up a fight because IF IT HAD BEEN conceded that the corporation had an 
obligation to undo its own security systems, then in cases where there is prosecutorial 
interest it would face a series of undoing security codes—passing along government and 
private surveillance opportunities part to part to part. Cell phones were aligned in metonymic 
array carrying the stamp of open, constant surveillance possibilities by private corporations 
directed by state agencies, first in the United States then likely around the globe. The naming 
process used in the court identified millions of phones as the need for “access” in order to 
fulfill the obligation of a “warrant” justified by setting up the defeasible condition. 
Metonymic reasoning was capped by reducing to absurdity the condition. The logic of 
government access to phones mandating that locks be compromised is similar to government 
access to homes mandating that locks be removed—all in the name of security that protects 
from rare or imagined (imminent as anticipated at some point) terrorist invasions. The 
government found third source to gain the information. The argument remains. The Internet 
renders material objects that set sights for communication and means to connect subject to 
metonymic chaining, whether authorized by the open and hidden measures of the state or 
smuggled into dark, vast hidden communities of practice.  
 There are several implications of the paper by Mauer and Mauer. The rhetorical force 
of defeasible argument needs to be understood, particularly as systems of control scrape 
away protections to liberty. Defeasible is only understood incompletely when transferred 
from a form of reasoning to an instrument of argumentation. Institutions that deploy 
defeasible reasoning to anticipate and discount arguments need to be held to close 
accountability by the populations they purport to serve. The burden of showing cause to 
defeat the rule figures rhetorically into constructions of identity and the performance of 
getting counted. Is metonymy the only, chief, or just one of many tropes that animates 
defeasible security argumentation apparatus? Second, the Internet is a vehicle for the 
announcement, coordination, and publicity of activities that seem to be open. The net is far 
from that, particularly as clouds digitize vast numbers of words, things, and information. 
Routine filters contribute to a naïve confidence in the range of non-private activities and 
negative performances that it hosts. The exploration of efforts to connect actors who prefer to 
remain hidden, remote, anonymous remind us that “natural language” analysis is by 
definition based upon highly artificial systems of visibility, search, and disclosure. Third, 
Enlightenment values such as freedom, privacy, liberty are conflicted with neo-liberal 
practices that front libertarian entrepreneurial rhetorics with systems of appropriation, 
control, and isolating filters. Critical argument inquiry of the practices of apparently innocent 
informal logic invite candid appraisal and analysis. We owe a debt of gratitude to Lauer and 
Lauer for bringing these things to our attention.  
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